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At a time when women are equally represented in professional fields such as medicine and academia, the
finance industry is still facing a lack of gender diversity, most notability at the C-Suite level. Statistics on
the paucity of women paint a bleak picture, despite the fact that women are awarded majority of
undergraduate and graduate degrees in the United States, a reversal from just one generation ago. This
begs the question, what is deterring women from a career in finance? Are compensation discrepancies at
play? This paper seeks to examine if being a female truly penalizes a woman in regards to annual
compensation within the financial services industry.
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Where Are the Women in Finance? An Introduction:
At a time when women are achieving equality in monetary compensation and increasing their
numbers in most job market sectors, female employees continue to be notoriously scarce in the
financial services industry (Ritzholtz, 2016). Women now constitute 52% of the countries
physicians and 32% of the United States’ lawyers, but in the financial services industry, women
persistently are the minority, most notably at the CEO level (BLS, 2019). Gender disparity
refers to the differences in women's and men's social status and well-being. These distinctions
typically favor men and are often institutionalized through law, justice and social norms. While
the gender gap in the financial industry has improved marginally since the turn of the century,
the statistics remain extremely skewed and do not reflect other professional occupations nor the
general population (Ciancio, 2019). As of June 2019, the number of female CEOs is at an alltime high, evident by Figure 1 below, with a total of 33 women at the helm of Fortune 500
companies (Zillman, 2019).

Figure 1:

A 2014 Wall Street Journal research study which analyzed women’s earnings and compensation
in the ten major occupation groups where women lagged the most, noted five were in finance.
This included securities and commodities sales agents, personal financial advisors, financial
clerks, financial managers, financial examiners, and other miscellaneous finance jobs. Within
financial services, the most notable pay gap was among certified financial planners, where
women earned approximately $32,000 a year less on average, according to this Wall Street
Journal study of 500 advisors. The CFP Board which certifies financial planners dubbed it the
“feminine famine”. An advisory panel concluded gender discrimination were among factors
dissuading women in the profession (Adamy & Overberg, 2016).

Historical financial performance has demonstrated that companies where women accounted for
at least 30% of their executives typically demonstrated higher profits than those with less
representation (Sargis & Wing). But, in a survey conducted by Fidelity Investments through a
survey titled “Women and Money”, less than 9% of respondents thought that women were better

investors than men (Cannivet, 2018). Less than 2% of the industry’s assets are managed by
women exclusively in the United States. At top-tier investment firms, approximately 74% of
assets are managed solely by men, with mixed-gender teams accounting for the remaining 26%.
A Morningstar research report concluded that women fund managers generated annual returns of
approximately 100 basis points more than male managed funds over five years, ceteris paribus.
This was done by tracking both fund performance and manager performance, and industry
standard performance tests, such as portfolio-based tests, regressions, and event studies were
performed. This was done for both fixed income and equity funds, illustrated by Figures 2 and 3,
respectively. It was concluded that fund performance cannot explain the paucity of women
present in the investment industry (Sargis & Wing).

Figure 2:

Figure 3:

Statistics and studies on the issue currently paint a bleak picture. Bloomberg reports that women
make up only 17% of employees in venture capital, real estate and private equity firms. This
appears noteworthy, as women are awarded 57% of all bachelor’s degrees and 59% of master’s

degrees, a reversal from just one generation ago. This begs the question, where is all this
potential and talent going, and what is deterring women from a career in finance? Are
compensation discrepancies at play?

Although men and women enter the workforce at the same rate, women begin to fall
professionally behind men early in their life. This often happens at the level of the very first
promotion, blowing open a gender gap that continues to widen every step up the ladder. As
males move upwards, females remain in entry level positions, perpetuating and widening the gap
at the leadership level (Fuhrmans, 2019). This disparity also has to do with differences in the
psychological thinking patterns of men and women. The Fifth Annual Women in the Workplace
study conducted by Lean In and McKinsey & Company, collected data from 329 companies with
a collective 13 million employees. Approximately 40% of women believe they are evaluated
differently than their male coworkers, while only 14% of men believe this statement. When
asked to respond to the statement, “There are too few qualified women in the pipeline”, 13% of
women agreed, 21% of men agreed, and human resources noted a 45% agreeance (McKinsey &
Company, 2019). This paper will seek to determine if there is a true compensation disparity for
women in the financial services industry and if so, the reasons for the discrepancy.

A Review of Existing Literature:
Previous research regarding the wage discrimination among men and women in finance
identified numerous other factors, not simply compensation disparity, that are leading to the
paucity of senior women in the finance industry. These influences range from the prioritization
of family over work, the instinctive conservative nature of women, to the industry-wide

discrimination among executives when assigning projects. When analyzing statistics regarding
salaries of men and women, care must be taken to ensure that levels of education and years of
experience are comparable.

Madden (2012) highlights the pay wage gap in relation to gender among financial professionals.
Women have accounted for approximately one third of financial services professionals
consistently over the past decade. While their income has increased minimally in relation to their
male counterparts, the earnings gap continues to be present. As Figure 4 below suggests, women
now make 66% of the salary of their male colleagues. Therefore, although the earning gap has
narrowed, it certainly still exists. Upon closer examination, this compensation disparity consists
of multiple important elements.

Figure 4:

The same study analyzed two of the largest stock brokerage firms in the United States. When the
number of years of professional experience were controlled, women still earned 12% less than

men at one of the large, but unnamed firms. Although the second large firm that was analyzed
had higher compensation for both men and women, the gender compensation gap was still
similar. A 20% difference in the median salary is present for brokers with ten years of
experience, and an 18% difference for brokers with 25 years of experience. In one of the firms
evaluated, women accounted for a mere 14% of stockbrokers, while the other had even fewer
women, accounting for only eleven percent of financial employees. Madden also uncovered that
the variable gender is statistically significant, with coefficients of -10 and -18, respectively. The
evidence was shown to demonstrate significant performance-support bias. Performance-support
bias is a practice in which women receive inferior and lower commission work assignments
causing a gap in pay. Gender differences were the basis for management's discretionary
assignments of sales opportunities, with the end result of gender pay gap among stockbrokers in
these two companies (Madden, 2012).

Additionally, there are other factors that could potentially influence this pay discrepancy. An
analysis of the same two firms revealed that upper level management gave women secondary
assignments and projects to those of their male colleagues. Men and women may consider
different lifestyle or family constraints in their career decisions. Thus, the hiring processes is
thought to initially separate more women into less high paying specialties. In the financial
services industry, wages are linked to commission. This study concluded that because women
were assigned to lower profile projects, the end result was lower annual commissions and
bonuses (Madden, 2012). Another analysis revealed that among Wall Street investment bankers,
longer hours worked increased earnings, but that women earned less than men even when hours
and other job and organizational factors were controlled (Roth 2004). Roth’s research

demonstrated that within 5-7 years after completing the MBA, women were more likely than
men to find themselves moving from high-paying corporate finance jobs into lower-paying jobs
in equity research or asset management, in smaller firms, or out of the securities industry.

Roth ultimately concluded that women who stayed in areas like corporate finance and sales and
trading at top firms were unusual in two ways. First, they typically had a powerful mentor who
supported their careers, and surprisingly this mentor was usually male. Additionally, these
women were highly career-committed, determined to be successful, and strategic about
managing their careers to maximize their success and longevity within the securities industry.
Additionally, among female CFA Charterholders, having a mother who worked in the STEM
field increases the probability of a daughter becoming a CFA member by 48% more than a son.
(Adam, Barber, & Odean, 2016). Most of these women deliberately chose or moved into areas
where their success would not depend on subjective evaluations of performance among male
managers and peers. Efforts to increase women's representation at higher echelons of maledominated occupations and to improve women's relative compensation might focus on
counseling women to enter jobs where their contributions are objectively measurable (Roth,
2004).

The perceived ability of female employees has been analyzed. Women are promoted less into
commission sales jobs due to the fact that they are considered less aggressive. Women also tend
to work for smaller firms than men (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). Firm executives report that
women have less “innate” abilities when it comes to finance (Madden, 2012). As per Figure E in
the appendix, only 43% of men view mixed gendered portfolio management teams as ideal.

Additionally, because of real or perceived personality differences, women are not considered as
strong investors due to their cautiousness (Eckel & Füllbrunn, 2015). Despite these perceived
characteristics, a 2003 study demonstrated that in competitive environments with both men and
women, women perform just as well if not even better than men. Groups of men and women
were tasked with solving computer mazes. When payoff was determined by individual
performance, there is no difference in female performance when compared to males. (Gneezy,
Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003).

The lack of women in finance has also been attributed to the math gender gap. While there is no
biological advantage to males pursuing STEM, math education of school-aged girls significantly
impacts their career as a woman. Stereotypes ingrained in society are prevalent regarding when it
comes to women in math, and men are two times as likely to get hired over a woman with the
same math proficiencies (Adam, Barber, & Odean, 2016).

Women tend to face greater time obligations outside of work, and finance is a career that
ultimately disproportionately rewards those who work demanding, long, and inflexible hours.
(Adam, Barber, & Odean, 2016). These economists behind this research also found that single
women are 36% more likely to recapture time from work when compared to single men. Married
women with children are 100% more likely than married men to desire to recapture time from
work. In this sense, recapture work is defined as working 10% less hours for 10% less pay.
Women who highly value conformity and traditional gender roles are less likely to work in
finance, and especially unlikely to become CFA Charterholders, evident by Figures A, B, and C,
located in the appendix.

Bertrand and Hallock (2001) argue that while this wage inequality could be due to gender
discrimination there are other factors as well that could be the root of the issue. One of the less
obvious factors could be the difference between men and women that causes women to have a
relative lack of commitment to their careers in the long term. This is likely a combination of
several factors. There is the societal expectation that women will take responsibility for their
families and prioritize them over work (Roth, 2004). See appendix, Figure C.

In addition, the lack of that initial promotion can contribute to the altered trajectory. Therefore,
the career tracks for women lead them to most likely be less driven towards management
positions but rather to the lesser compensated but more flexible jobs (Roth, 2004). Roth also
argues that pregnancy discrimination was commonly done by male colleagues whose wives were
homemakers. They perceived that their own aspirations to combine career and family failed to fit
a mold for "family" that these men could understand. Figure 5 demonstrates how motherhood
impacts earnings. This provides evidence that this is not just an issue domestically, but is also
present in other parts of the world such as Denmark. Roth uncovered that gender, marital status,
parental status, undergraduate major, and hours per week explained approximately 4% of
differences in total compensation. As expected, weekly hours worked had significant impacts on
earnings. Each additional hour increased annual compensation by approximately 5%. At the
same time, men and women estimated that they worked a similar number of hours per week and
had unequal compensation even when they worked the same hours. Women earned 39% less
than men with the same background, marital and family status, undergraduate major, experience

in the industry, and hours per week, according to Roth. Roth believes this difference is due to
women going to work at smaller tier firms (Roth, 2006).
Figure 5:

It is hypothesized that maternity leave laws and work-life balance conflicts negatively affect
businesswomen salaries and advancement opportunities. Currently in the United States, new
mothers receive six weeks of paid maternity leave to care for her newborn child. Women who
desire more time off with her baby may apply under Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for
an additional six to twelve weeks of unpaid time off with no threat of job loss under the federal
law. Within the financial services industry, due to the high stress environment and type of work,
there might be pressure by employers to limit leave of absences. According to the World Health
Organization, it is ideal that new mothers take a minimum of 16 weeks off post birth to properly
care for herself and her newborn (Baker & Milligan, 2008). There is a wage penalty associated
with motherhood, and even higher penalties for currently married or previously married women
than for single mothers (Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2004). This is due to the loss of experience, or
time away from the workplace, while childbearing and causing them to be less productive at
work. Investment style Wall Street jobs do not accommodate caregiving responsibilities (Baker

& Milligan, 2008). Within the industry, due to the demand and type of work, there is pressure by
employers to limit leave of absence. Due to this pressure, Baker and Milligan hypothesized that
women are worried about discrimination and job security if they become pregnant. While U.S.
law prohibits firing due to familial status, Wall Street culture puts pressure on pregnant women
and young mothers, to continue to work at an intense and persistent pace. These laws are ideal
for short term childbearing, but not intensive long term child-rearing (Roth, 2006).

While the treatment of women in the workplace has been garnering media attention recently, it is
believed that an important reason so few females strive for a finance career has been present for
decades. Wall Street firms such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs developed stringent
policies in the late 1990s to prevent verbal and sexual harassment. Even with these regulations in
place, institutional theories suggest that firms have adopted official policies without fully
implementing them (Roth, 2006). Roth explains that the poor treatment of women stems from a
macho-man environment, and women believe it would be more damaging to their careers to
report sexual harassment, or even result in the loss of their jobs. 45% of women believe the
policies in place are ineffective. One study conducted reports that 23% of female Wall Street
executives were harassed verbally, emotionally, or sexually by their managers, and 11% by their
coworkers (Roth, 2006).

The attempt to achieve work-life balance also contributes to this wage discrepancy. However,
this issue seems to be mainly focused on women. Baker and Milligan (2001) found that extended
maternity leave increases the likelihood that women will return to their pre-birth employer. It is
noted that men with school aged children who work as Wall Street investors also experience

work-family balance struggles, but are not penalized as harshly in terms of scheduling conflicts
and salary cuts (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). This is because they are viewed as their children’s
secondary caretakers instead of their primary ones (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001). It has been
calculated that throughout their careers, women will forfeit about $274,000 of earnings due to
caregiving responsibilities for their children (Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2004). This earning analysis
was based on 500 parental respondents, who had children under the age of 16, and worked a
minimum of 35 hours per week. These findings are consistent with multiple academic studies.

Data:
For this analysis, data was collected from the Executive Compensation database (Execucomp),
which is part of Wharton Research Data Services. This details executive salary, additional
compensation, and position in the firm among S&P 1000 companies. For this research, it is
imperative to gather data on both men and women. Execucomp details data from 2010-2018, and
has useful information such as a company’s return on assets, net sales, and number of employees
in addition to salary information. This data was obtained from a connection at Michigan State
University. Tables 1 and 2 provide a description of variables used and expected signs.

Variable Descriptions:
Table 1: Description of Variables
Variables

Description

Gross Domestic

The monetary measure of final goods and services during a

Product (GDP)

specified period of time. The higher the wealth in the US, the more

people are looking to the finance field for guidance. Measured in
billions of current dollars.

Salary (dependent

The annual salary of a finance professional, which includes base

variable)

pay, bonuses, and stock compensation. Measured in thousands.

Gender

Dummy variable, 0 is professional is female, 1 is the professional is
male

Age of Executive

Age of financial executive, measured in years.

Return on Assets

The average annual return on assets, measured in thousands of
dollars.

CEO

Dummy variable, 1if the individual’s title is chief executive officer,
0 otherwise.

CAO

Dummy variable, 1if the individual’s title is chief accounting
officer, 0 otherwise.

CFO

Dummy variable, 1if the individual's title is chief financial officer, 0
otherwise.

COO

Dummy variable, 1 if the individual's title is chief operating officer,
0 otherwise.

President

Dummy variable, 1 if the individual's title is president, 0 otherwise.

Tenure

How long the individual has held an executive position, measured
in years.

Small

The size of the firm in which an executive works. Classified as
“small” if 3,000 or less employees are present.

Medium

The size of the firm in which an executive works. Classified as
“medium” if between 3,000 and 14,000 employees are present.

Fertility Rate

The average number of children born to a woman over her lifetime

Other macroeconomic indicators were initially included in this analysis and later removed upon
further examination. These indicators included the labor force participation rate for females and
the female unemployment rate. A correlation matrix revealed that these variables, along with
GDP, had a correlation of over 0.90. Because of this, the most relevant indicator, annual
domestic GDP, remained in this analysis. Also, only firms that were classified as small and
medium were included. If large were to be included, perfect multicollinearity would exist.

Similarly, a high correlation was present between a firm’s return on assets, net sales, and total
assets. Return on assets provides the best indicator of a firm’s performance and therefore
remained in this analysis.

Expected Signs:
These hypothesized signs are based on existing literature and economic theory.
Table 2:
Variables

Hypothesized Sign

Gross Domestic

+, when a greater amount of goods are being produced, this implies

Product (GDP)

that firms are making higher revenues, and therefore paying their
employees higher wages

Male

+, being male (or female) will result in a positive annual salary, as
per Roth and Bertrand & Hallock

Age of Executive

+, the older the executive, the more seasoned and experienced,
hence a higher annual salary

Return on Assets

+, if the firm is generating return on their assets, salaries are going
to be positive

CEO

+, holding the title of chief executive officer would increase salary

CAO

+, holding the title of chief accounting officer would increase salary

CFO

+, holding the title of chief financial officer would increase salary

COO

+, holding the title of chief operating officer would increase salary

President

+, holding the title of president would increase salary

Tenure

+, the longer an individual has been an executive, the higher their
respective salary

Small

+, working at a firm classified as “small” will positively impact
salary

Medium

+, working at a firm classified as “medium” will positively impact
salary

Fertility Rate

-, the more children born to a woman, the less she will be working,
hence a lower salary

Theoretical Model:
Salary = β0 + β1Male + β2ExecAge + β3CAO + β4CEO + β5CFO + β6COO + β7President +
β8GDP + β9Return on Assets + β10Tenure + β11GDP + β12Small + β13Medium - β14Fertility Rate
+ε

Results:
To properly analyze the data, an ordinary least squares model was used. This type of model
minimizes the sum of squared residuals from the data. The independent variable of executives
age was intended to be placed in the model, but due to the lack of variation of this variable, it
was taken into account via the intercept. A left-semi log was used so results would be able to be
explained in terms of percentages. The data created models for the entire data set (men and
women combined), just women, and just men. To analyze this data, SAS programming software
was utilized.

Descriptive Statistics:
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the entire sample

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Women

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Men

Tables 3-5 illustrate the descriptive statistics for this sample. It is interesting to see that the mean
values do not vary greatly between men and women. Men have a slightly larger salary and
tenure, in addition to slightly greater return on assets. This shows that men, on average, tend to
work for larger firms with stronger financial statements. The standard deviations of salary for
women and men can be seen on Tables 4 and 5. It is noteworthy that the standard deviation, or
variation, is much greater for women than it is for men

Regression Analysis:
Table 6: Regression for the entire sample

Above are the results for the entire data set, all executives, both men and women. This is
comprised of 18,725 observations. Tenure squared is the only independent variable that appears

to be significant at the 10% level. Also, annual salary seems to be independent of a firm’s
performance, as return on assets has little impact.

Table 7: Female Regression

This model is a subset of the previous model; as only female executives are being analyzed. This
sample consists of 2,549 observations. Here, fertility rate decreases overall salary by $1,200,
ceteris paribus, like the previous model. With tenure being insignificant, this indicates that
annual salary is independent of how long an individual has been an executive. Also, being a
COO or president actually decreases overall salary. This is because women who are in these
roles are paid less relative to their male counterparts, evident by the preceding literature.

Table 8: Male Regression

This sample size contains observations of just male executives with 16,176 observations. Unlike
women, working for a firm that is classified as small does not negatively impact overall annual
salary, but medium does. Unlike women, the variable president does not have a negative
coefficient. This model does not differ greatly from that of the female only model, indicating that
men and women are not treated that differently in terms of salary.

Data Subset: Female CFOs
To further examine the characteristics of female executives at top firms, a subset detailing
exclusively, Chief Financial Officers, or CFOs was analyzed. For this subset, an ordinary least
squares regression was used.

Table 9: All CFOs, Men and Women

Here, it is interesting that return on assets is not significant. The goal of a CFO is to maximize
that financial indicator, as well as return on equity. It was also expected that the parameter
estimate would have a larger impact on overall compensation.

Table 10: Female CFOs

Out of the 2,950 CFOs, 405 were women. Here, none of the independent variables appear to be
significant at the 10% level. Once again, it is surprising that return on assets does not have a
larger coefficient, as that is the measure of a firm’s financial success. Being a CFO, one would
think that return on assets would have a higher impact on annual salary.

Table 11: Male CFOs

There are a total of 2,545 male CFOs in the sample. Unlike women, working at a firm that is
classified as small or medium ultimately lowers respective salaries. Unlike women, tenure, or the
number of years as an executive, is significant for men, evident by the t-statistic. Fertility rate is
significant evident by the t-statistic of -2.67.

After this analysis, it is seen that there are no obvious or major discrepancies between male and
female executives. But, in terms of relative wages, a higher wage is seen for males in the
descriptive statistics. But interestingly, it appears that one is penalized more harshly for being a
male CFO than female.

Econometric Testing:
Econometric testing was done to check for multicollinearity, serial correlation, and
heteroscedasticity in the various regression models. Muticollinearity occurs when two or more
are highly, linearly correlated, ultimately undermining the significance of an explanatory
variable. Refer to Table 1 for a discussion about multicollinearity. Serial correlation, or the
relationship and/or correlation between a variable and the lagged version of itself, is a violation
of classical assumption IV. Heteroscedasticity is the presence of residuals that are not random.
This can be worrisome because if it is present, it assumes that an ordinary least squares
regression model is no longer the best linear unbiased estimator.

Table 12: Econometric Testing for the Entire Sample (Both genders, all positions)

Table 13: Econometric Testing for Females

Table 14: Econometric Testing for Males

Table 15: Econometric Testing for All CFOs

Table 16: Econometric Testing for Female CFOs

Table 17: Econometric Testing for Male CFOs

After identifying that serial correlation and heteroscedasticity were present in some of the
models, using SAS, a proc survey reg was used to find clustered robust standard errors because
an OLS model was originally used. Then, SAS produced new parameter estimates after
correcting for these errors. The Durbin-Watson statistic was used to determine if serial
correlation was present, while the chi-squared was used to check for heteroscedasticity. Serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity can inflate standard errors. After being corrected, the standard
errors did not change dramatically, evident that the cases of these econometric errors present
were not very large and impactful.

Table 18: New Parameter Estimates (Both Men and Women, All Executive Positions)

The new parameter estimates for the entire sample is above. With a Durbin-Watson statistic of
0.904, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity were present. This corrected estimate is nearly
identical to the initial regression output, expect both small and medium have positive signs.
Besides GDP, none of the variables are significant at the 10% level. The standard errors did not
change by a large amount.

Table 19: New Parameter Estimates for Women

With a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.390, serial correlation is present but heteroscedasticity is not,
evident by the chi-squared statistic. Above is coefficient estimates, corrected for the econometric
error. This correction is similar to the original parameter estimates for women, as are the
standard errors.

Table 20: New Parameter Estimates for Men

In the initial regression, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity were present. The corrected
model has nearly the same coefficients as the original ones, with the coefficients impacting
salary the same way. The standard errors remain barely unchanged.

Table 21: New Parameter Estimates for All CFOs

The econometric testing indicated that both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity were
present. Above are the corrected estimates and standard errors, with minimal change.

Table 22: New Parameter Estimates for Female CFOs

In the original female CFO regression, no serial correlation or heteroscedasticity were evident.
Still using the survey reg, the results can be seen above.

Table 23: New Parameter Estimates for Male CFOs

For the male CFO analysis, while there was no serial correlation, heteroscedasticity is present.
When corrected, the estimated independent variables remained the nearly the same.

During this econometric analysis, it was evident that the independent variables fertility rate and
tenure appeared to be correlated. Based on economic theory, it was decided to leave both of the
variables in the models. If removed, it is possible that this could result in omitted variable bias.

Discussion and Future Implications:
While no overarching statement can be made regarding wages of female executives compared to
their male counterparts, there are interesting pieces of anecdotal evidence that can help shed light
on to the topic. Specifically, why are there so few female executives when compared to men?
Only 13.6% of this sample were female. And although wages are similar, why is overall relative
wages slightly lower for women when compared to men? Then what is the literature referencing
about a discrepancy? Top-tier investment firms such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and
Vanguard have various women in finance initiatives, as they have even realized there is a gender

discrepancy in the industry. Based on the popular press and literature, it is odd that the results are
not more dramatic.

One major limitation of this analysis is the presence of unobservable heterogeneity, or the
presence of various factors that are not measurable. This includes personal habits such as work
ethic, personality, and grit. There is also a great amount of omitted variables that would have
made this analysis more exact, including marital status, number of children, and education level.
After many discussions with both male and female professionals in the finance industry, one
common, anecdotal theme was recognized. Women are more disciplined in the risks that they
take, while male are more impatient, impulsive, and reactive when it comes to trading and
market performance.

While salaries do not differ greatly, there is still a paucity of women in executive roles. Based on
this analysis, we are unsure if women are not in these roles due to personal choice or due to
employer preference. The environmental feel of a company is also extremely important in the
hiring and retention of both men and women.

Similarly, the data set is flawed. There is an absence of key indicators, which was a primary
constraint in the analysis. For example, tenure was a created variable using the executives current
age and the year they became an executive at their respective firm. This proxy is not the same as
the number of years the individual was an executive.

While completing this analysis, observations were made regarding the type of firm in which a
woman is employed. Women tend to hold titles such as CEO, CFO, CAO, and COO at firms
with weaker financial statements compared to men; that is, lower return on asset ratio and lower
net sales. Women were also employed at firms that had recently declared bankruptcy, evident by
leadership changes at General Motors. This may lead one to consider whether women are chosen
to lead a company when the firm is in the red and struggling? Are women a last ditch effort for
companies? More executive roles for women are noticeable at firms that fall into the consumer
staples sector, such as household products and food and beverage. In addition to consumer
staples, retail establishments that are marketed towards females have a female C-suite team,
including but not limited to Ulta Beauty, Vera Bradley, and Bed Bath and Beyond.

While this issue is not solvable and no dramatic conclusions can be drawn, this is just the
beginning of this conversation. While this study used 11 independent variables to describe
annual salary, there are indeed many more, which are unmeasurable without numerical values. It
appears that women are not penalized because of their gender in terms of wages, but males the
number of males’ present is overwhelmingly disproportional. It is also curious how funds
exclusively managed by women outperform their male counterparts by 100 basis points in
regards to annual returns. (Sargis & Wing). If women are successful in this field, even more so
then men, is why is the matriculation rate into finance so low? Perhaps it is due to the
notoriously scarce work-life balance present in the investment industry.

While there is no one solution, perhaps a multifaceted approach holds the most chance of success
in improving the standing of and subsequent members of female executives. Over time,

hopefully women are encouraged to enter this rigorous field leading to increased profitability for
all.

Appendix:
The Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation is globally recognized and given to qualified
candidates from the CFA Institute. Candidates for the CFA designation are required to pass three
levels of exams sequentially, with each exam offered annually. It is recommended by the CFA
Institute that a candidate should study for 300 hours per exam to receive a passing score. These
exams cover topics including economics, ethics, financial reporting and analysis, fixed income,
corporate finance, equity investments, derivatives, and portfolio management. Each exam has a
pass rate that hovers around 40%, with only approximately 10% of individuals who begin the
program with the Level I exam continue to obtain the designation. As per the CFA Institute, this
designation is considered the “gold standard” of the investment and finance industry. Common
professions for Charterholders include portfolio managers, investment officers, and research
analysts. Approximately 15% of Charterholders worldwide are women.

Annually, the CFA Institute surveys current Charterholders about their careers, marital status,
and perspectives about the investment industry. Some responses from this survey are below.

Figure A:
Marital Status of CFA holders:

Married or
married-like

Female

Female

Male

Male

Total

Total

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

740

71.7

3,160

79.4

3,900

77.8

relationship
Widowed

6

0.6

11

0.3

17

0.3

Divorced

66

6.4

98

2.5

164

3.3

Separated

9

0.9

33

0.8

42

0.8

Never

211

20.4

680

17.1

891

17.8

1,032

100.0

3,982

100.0

5,014

100.0

married
Total

Figure B:
If a CFA holder indicated they are married or in a marriage-like relationship, their spouse:

Spouse has a

Female

Female

Male

Male

Total

Total

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

562

79.0

1,540

50.7

2,102

56.1

49

6.9

488

16.1

537

14.3

55

7.7

899

29.6

954

25.5

full-time
occupation
Spouse has a
part-time
occupation
Spouse’s

primary
work
involves
taking care
of our
home/family
None of the

45

6.3

109

3.6

154

4.1

711

100.0

3,036

100.0

3,747

100.0

above
Total

It is interesting to note that 79% of women who have elite finance jobs have spouses that work
full-time compared to 51% of men that have spouses that work full time. This is also noticeable
in childcare responsibilities. Reference Figure 7.

Figure C:
What proportion of the duties related to childcare is your responsibility?
Female

Female

Male

Male

Total

Total (%)

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

(number)

0-10%

17

3.4

139

6.1

156

5.6

11-20%

27

5.4

314

13.8

341

12.3

21-30%

27

5.4

454

19.9

481

17.3

31-40%

31

6.4

346

15.2

377

13.6

41-50%

68

13.7

519

22.7

587

21.1

51-60%

102

20.5

148

6.5

250

9.0

61-70%

54

10.9

55

2.4

109

3.9

71-80%

77

15.5

47

2.1

124

4.5

81-90%

42

8.5

30

1.3

72

2.6

91-100%

52

10.5

230

10.1

282

10.1

Total

497

100.0

2,282

100.0

2,779

100.0

Figure D:
How many children live with you?
Female

Female

Male

Male

Total

Total

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

(number)

(%)

0

579

56.0

1,873

46.8

2,452

48.7

1

175

16.9

693

17.3

868

17.2

2

223

21.6

996

24.9

1,219

24.2

3

49

4.7

352

8.8

401

8.0

4

5

0.5

66

1.6

71

1.4

5

2

0.2

11

0.3

13

0.3

6

-

0.0

6

0.1

6

0.1

7

-

0.0

1

0.0

1

0.0

More

1

0.1

3

0.1

4

0.1

1,034

100.0

4,001

100.0

5,035

100.0

than 8
Total

Figure E:
CFA holders were asked about their point of view regarding industry diversification. Responses
were as follows:
Female

Believe mixed
gendered teams
lead to better
investment
performance
results because
of diverse

Female

Male

(number) (%)

(number)

648

1,569

69.5

Male (%)

42.5

Total

Total

(number)

(%)

2,217

47.9

viewpoints
Do not believe

177

19.0

1,142

30.9

1,319

28.5

107

11.5

984

26.6

1,091

23.6

932

100.0

3,695

100.0

4,627

100.0

mixed gendered
teams lead to
better
investment
performance
results, but
prefer to work
for a firm whose
corporate culture
is supportive of
gender diversity
Gender diversity
does not matter
when it comes to
managing
investments
Total
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